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Security is Not Enough: 
Ten Lessons for Conflict 
Resolution from Northern Ireland
Jonathan Powell
Northern Ireland is of course sui generis. Its conflict was unique and so was the solution. There is no Northern Ireland model that can be picked up and imposed on conflicts 
elsewhere and drawing facile parallels can be misleading.
But it is equally wrong to suggest that there are no lessons to be learned from Northern Ireland, from 
the mistakes we made and from the successes we achieved. Those lessons can be applied elsewhere, 
with care, by those seeking lasting settlements to armed conflicts so they can make their own mistakes 
rather than repeating ours. This paper sets out ten lessons I learned from over a decade of involvement 
in trying to bring peace to Northern Ireland.
First, there are no purely military solutions to insurgencies. Hugh Orde, the former Chief Constable of 
Northern Ireland, has wisely pointed out that there are no examples anywhere in the world of terrorist 
problems being ‘policed out’. In the end if there is a political problem at the root of the conflict then 
there has to be a political solution. That is not to say that security measures have no place. On the 
contrary, they are essential. Without security pressure downwards, insurgents will find life comfortable 
and have no incentive to make the tough decisions necessary for peace. But security pressure by itself 
without offering a political way out will simply cause the insurgents to fight to the last man. 
In Northern Ireland the British army and the police could have contained the IRA indefinitely, but they 
were never going to wipe them out. It was only the offer of negotiations that eventually brought the 
violence to a close. Some commentators, largely on the right, believe that the IRA was badly penetrated 
by the security services and that if only they had been allowed to get on with the job unencumbered by 
political interference they would have finally defeated the IRA. That is what I call the ‘security delusion’. 
Its adherents believe that one more heave would have solved the problem. But it is a delusion. It is true 
the IRA were infiltrated and true they were exhausted by the long military campaign, but they were not 
going to collapse however long we kept fighting them. 
Some point to Sri Lanka as proof that there can be a purely military solution to an insurgency. It is true 
that Prabrakhan, the leader of the Tamil Tigers, appears to have been insane enough to believe he could 
win a conventional military campaign against the Sri Lankan armed forces. He was proved wrong. But it 
is a mistake, unfortunately, to believe that this conventional military victory will be the end of the story. 
Unless the underlying Tamil grievances are addressed politically it is probable that the terrorist campaign 
will start all over again and such a campaign will be impossible to resolve by purely military means.
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The second lesson is that you cannot stop the violence 
without talking to the men with guns. We were 
criticised in Northern Ireland for undermining the 
political centre by focussing on the IRA. But that was 
exactly the point. Unless we could get the IRA to stop 
we would not bring peace to Northern Ireland.
There is however a Catch 22 to this need to talk which 
leads governments to do it in secret, as the British 
government did from 1973 to 1993. Democratic 
governments cannot be seen to be talking to terrorist 
groups while they are killing their people; but terrorist 
groups will not give up fighting unless the governments 
can convince them there is a political way forward to 
achieve their aims. If it had been known that John 
Major’s government was communicating with the 
IRA, just as the IRA were letting off their bombs in 
Warrington in which they killed two young boys, 
there would have been public revulsion. John Major 
was quite right to say that it would turn his stomach 
to talk to the IRA. But he was also quite right to be 
communicating with them even as he said those 
words. If he had not done so there would have been 
no peace. The secret correspondence with Martin 
McGuinness offering a political way out led to the 
IRA ceasefire in 1994.
Governments are sometimes accused of appeasement 
for talking to insurgent groups. That is to misunderstand 
the nature of appeasement. Chamberlain’s mistake 
at Munich was not in talking to Hitler. That was a 
sensible thing to do. It was to believe that by offering 
Hitler a slice of Czechoslovakia he could buy him off. 
Accepting the terrorist demands under the threat 
of violence would be appeasement. But talking to 
terrorists is not the same as agreeing with them. We 
talked to the Republican movement but we never 
offered them the united Ireland that they had been 
seeking by force. On the contrary we persuaded them 
to accept the principle of consent whereby the status 
of Northern Ireland could only be changed by the will 
of the majority.
Of course talking to terrorists can be counterproductive 
if badly handled, as for example in the past with the 
FARC in Colombia. It can legitimise the armed group; 
it can provide perverse incentives – one terrorist leader 
with whom I have dealt announced he was going to 
“pile bodies on the table” to increase his negotiating 
leverage with a burst of violence before negotiations 
started; and the offer of talks can convince the terrorists 
that they are winning and encourage them to intensify 
their campaign. But all of these are questions of timing 
and tactical handling rather than arguments against 
speaking to terrorist at all. 
Third, insurgent groups will not just surrender. 
In December 2004 we got very close to brokering an 
agreement between the DUP and Sinn Féin but it fell 
apart at the last minute when the DUP demanded 
photographs of the decommissioning of IRA weapons 
and Ian Paisley made a speech calling on Republicans to 
wear ‘sackcloth and ashes’. For the IRA that smacked 
of surrender and they refused to sign up.
Insurgent groups need a narrative to explain to their 
supporters what they have achieved and why all the 
sacrifice was worthwhile. If an agreement looks like 
abject surrender they will reject it. For that reason it is 
a mistake to insist on preconditions before beginning 
talks. As I said above, democratic governments find 
it very hard to be seen to talk to insurgent groups 
until there is a ceasefire. But to demand additional 
pre-conditions before talks can start is usually a 
mistake. In Northern Ireland it is easy to see how the 
Major government came to make decommissioning 
of terrorist weapons a pre-condition, but it was a 
mistake to do so. John Major did not want to find 
himself negotiating under the threat of violence and so 
he demanded a permanent ceasefire. When it became 
clear that would not be forthcoming, he demanded 
instead that they decommission all their weapons. Not 
surprisingly they refused to do so, and the government 
watered down its demand to decommissioning the 
majority of its weapons, to decommissioning some of 
its weapons and finally to decommissioning a token 
amount of its weapons. All of these demands were 
rejected too and talks were stymied. It took us more 
than ten years to work our way through the problem 
caused by the precondition of decommissioning. It is 
far better to address these issues in the negotiations 
themselves rather than making them a prior condition 
to be met before the talks can commence.
Fourth, there are many conditions that need to be in 
place before negotiations can succeed, but perhaps 
the most important is that both sides need to believe 
that they cannot win militarily. If either side thinks 
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it can win, it will not negotiate seriously but instead 
seek tactical advantage from the negotiation. In 
Northern Ireland the British army was clear by the early 
1980s that it could contain violence at ‘an acceptable 
level’ indefinitely but it could not win an outright 
victory. They therefore understood the need to seek 
a political settlement. On the other side, Adams and 
McGuinness had joined the Republican movement 
very young, but by the mid 1980s they were well 
past fighting age. The IRA had tried the short sharp 
shock, the long campaign, the mainland campaign, 
and the armalite in one hand and the ballot box in 
the other, but none of them had driven the Brits out. 
They knew the IRA could never be defeated but they 
also realised they could not achieve their objectives 
by purely military means. So they too started casting 
around for a political solution first by talking to John 
Hume and the Irish government and later by seeking 
entry to the all-party talks process. 
Fifth, there needs to be political leadership on both 
sides. In Northern Ireland Adams and McGuinness 
risked not just their political careers but their lives in 
leading their movement into a peace the movement 
would not have accepted at the beginning of the 
process; David Trimble and John Hume both sacrificed 
their political parties and their careers in order to 
achieve peace; Ian Paisley, having contributed to the 
start of the Troubles, decided after a close encounter 
with his maker in 2004 that he wanted to end his 
life as Dr Yes rather than Dr No; John Major stood to 
gain nothing politically from starting a peace process 
in Northern Ireland and yet decided to do so; and 
the fact that the British and Irish Prime Ministers, 
Tony Blair and Bertie Ahern, were willing and able to 
work seamlessly together for a decade made peace 
possible. Without political leaders prepared to take 
risks there will be no peace.
More than that there needs to be political momentum 
to achieve peace. Tony Blair deliberately used the 
magnitude of his landslide election victory in 1997 
to jump-start the process. His first visit out of London 
as Prime Minister after the election was to Northern 
Ireland to reassure the Unionist population that the 
new government would not sell them out in his 
speech in Balmoral. And he set a clear deadline for 
an agreement one year after the election, and stuck 
to it despite calls to abandon the deadline as too 
dangerous. If he had left it until later, when he was 
politically weaker, he may well not have succeeded. 
In his biography Tony Blair accuses me of saying he 
had a ‘Messiah complex’. In fact it was Mo Mowlam 
who said to me that he thought he was “f...ing 
Jesus”. But if he hadn’t believed that it was possible 
to reach an agreement in Northern Ireland and 
believed that he could achieve it, there would have 
been no agreement. 
Sixth, peace is a process not an event. When I wrote 
my book on Northern Ireland, the cabinet secretary 
allowed me to read back through the No. 10 files for 
the ten years between 1997 and 2007. One thing 
above all else jumped out of the files at me, and that 
was the importance of having a process in place. 
With a process there is cause for hope and parties 
are kept busy. Without a process a vacuum opens 
up and is rapidly filled by violence. If nothing else a 
process allows you to manage the problem even if 
you cannot solve it. In the Middle East the outlines 
of an eventual settlement are pretty clear in terms 
of land and of refugees and even of what should 
happen to Jerusalem. But there is no process. Shimon 
Peres summed up the problem neatly, saying, “the 
good news is there is light at the end of the tunnel. 
The bad news is there is no tunnel”.
Once you have the process up and running you must 
not let it stall. This is what I call the bicycle theory. 
Once the bicycle is up and moving do not let it fall 
over. If you do, you will find it incredibly difficult to 
pick it up again. Keeping it moving however requires 
ingenuity, coming up with a new way forward every 
time you meet a blockage, an ability to absorb 
political pain, as we had to do over the release of 
prisoners in 1998 and the Northern Bank robbery 
in 2004, and most of all a refusal to take no for 
an answer. 
Seventh, there is a role for third parties. The British 
government had long refused to countenance any 
international role in Northern Ireland, just as other 
governments around the world refuse to allow 
external actors to play a role in their conflicts. The 
British government however changed its mind in the 
early 1990s by inviting Ninian Stephen, an Australian, 
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to chair the talks. Later they invited George Mitchell to play the role of referee, a role he fulfilled with remarkable 
patience and balance. Third parties can also be crucial in guaranteeing independence. The IRA found it far 
easier to put their weapons beyond use through an international commission on decommissioning chaired 
by a Canadian General than they would have done handing them over to the Brits or the Unionists. And an 
independent Monitoring Commission reassured the Unionist population that here was an independent arbiter 
of whether or not the IRA had gone out of business in a way the British government could not.
Eighth, breakthrough agreements are the beginning not the end of a peace process. If as our helicopters took 
off from Stormont on the morning of Good Friday 1998 we thought that the job was done we would have 
been sadly disappointed. It took another nine years to get the agreement implemented. The same lesson can 
be learned the other way round from the Oslo Accords. When they were announced there was a burst of 
enthusiasm on both sides. But neither side did anything to implement the agreements or even to sell them 
effectively, and disillusion soon set in and the process collapsed into another Intifada. It is exactly when the 
breakthrough agreement is announced that efforts should be redoubled rather than both sides collapsing 
in exhaustion and doing nothing.
Ninth, there will only be a lasting settlement if both sides can break through the political zero-sum game. If 
one side comes out of the negotiation looking cheerful then the other side feels that it has lost, regardless of 
the substance. The most bizarre example of this was the 1994 ceasefire. When the ceasefire was announced 
it was the Republicans driving around town honking their horns and waving their flags and the Unionists 
who were sunk in gloom, even though the ceasefire was exactly what the Unionists had been demanding for 
decades. This zero-sum game dogged us right through the negotiations and we only finally got to a settlement 
when the Republicans realised they had to think about the constituency on the other side as well as their 
own and participate in selling the agreement to that other constituency. Agreements will only stick if both 
sides come out of the negotiations feeling like winners, rather than feeling they have been forced to give in.
My last lesson is that there is no conflict in the world, however long lasting, however bloody, however frozen 
that cannot be resolved. Successive British prime ministers from Churchill, to Wilson, to Thatcher believed 
that Northern Ireland was insoluble. A series of previous attempts from Sunningdale in 1973 to the Anglo-
Irish Agreement in 1985 to the Downing Street Declaration in 1994 had all failed. The eventual agreement in 
1998 was correctly described by Seamus Mallon as “Sunningdale for slow learners” and contained many of 
the same elements as in 1973. But all of those attempts at peace were not in vain. The eventual success was 
built on those failures. It required the parties to exhaust all the other alternative options and for the cycle of 
blood to go through a full revolution before both sides were prepared to make the painful concessions that 
were required for a lasting peace. In the right conditions, with patience and political leadership the Northern 
Ireland conflict was solved. And so can all other armed conflicts if the same effort is applied at the right time.  
